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EAST OF EDEN: ADDRESSING RUSSIAN INTERESTS DURING NATO ENLARGEMENT

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EAST OF EDEN:
ADDRESSING RUSSIAN INTERESTS
DURING NATO ENLARGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

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ABSTRACT:

The last five years have been turbulent times throughout Europe. The political, economic, military and social realities of a Europe no longer threatened by the Soviet Union calls into question the entire security architecture of the continent. In the process of redefining security and stability in Europe, many nations are looking to cultivate security relationships in areas that no longer enjoy the certainties of a bi-polar world.

Given the NATO will enlarge to meet the security needs of Europe and the North Atlantic region, this paper identifies Russian security interests that will be threatened by NATO enlargement. The author suggests how the United States should address Russian security interests during the enlargement process.

The last five years have been the best of times and the worst of times in Europe. The re-unification of Germany and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the Soviet Union have brought an end to Communism in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia and other post-Soviet republics. The deep and prolonged political instability and economic crises attendant on these changes, most of all in Southern Europe and the former Soviet Union, including Russia itself, have created new European military and political realities that call into question the whole security architecture in Europe.

A wide range of possibilities are now available to new states and old ones that have significant implications for the organizations that support European stability. Within this framework, NATO has taken the stance that enlargement is the key to redefining the security and stability of Europe without drawing new dividing lines between Europe and Russia.¹

Given that NATO will expand, this paper will identify
Russian security interests affected by NATO enlargement and
suggest how the United States should address Russian security
interests that may conflict with or derail NATO enlargement. A
quick look at the background of NATO expansion will establish
Russia as a key player in the process. Looking then at how
enlargement threatens Russian interests will lead to specific
ways in which the United States, as a matter of policy, can
support NATO enlargement by addressing Russian security concerns.

THE NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

The end of the Cold War has created almost a frenzy of political, economic and military activity within Eastern and Central Europe, especially the Visegrad countries. Many countries are now watching, waiting and often acting to free themselves from the habits ingrained by several decades of communist domination. Overcoming the communist legacy within their military, political and economic establishments has been a particularly difficult task. It is motivated by a drive to redefine a security and stability network that will prevent instability to threaten Central and Eastern Europe.

Amidst this fog of reorganization, NATO has survived as a proven structure for managing transatlantic security. NATO has contributed to the process by trying to expand its security umbrella eastward. More than just empty rhetoric, NATO has studied the issues and defined the "what" and the "why" of NATO expansion while at the same time establishing the requirements that will fill the security vacuum created with the withdrawal of Russian forces and political and economic controls. NATO's goal is to provide a gradual, deliberate and transparent process of enlargement that works with other security structures while threatening no one.³

In 1994, the alliance recognized that it would be necessary to examine ways in which NATO's forces and structures could respond more efficiently and flexibly to new security challenges while providing capabilities for Europeans to address security

concerns under their own banner. To help make it possible for non-NATO partners to develop NATO structures, the concept of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was developed. President Clinton's Partnership for Peace initiative became the centerpiece of the January 1994 NATO Summit. 5

This initiative sought to go beyond the systems already in place within the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and forge a real partnership with the new eastern democracies as well as former neutral countries. Within the partnership, each participating state will be encouraged to pursue its relationship with NATO at a pace and scope determined by its own capabilities and interests. This dynamic interaction between NATO members and non-members through PfP shows the overall strategy to enlarge NATO as a evolutionary process that moves beyond the competitive alliance systems that have long plagued European history. 6

The results of enticing nations with the opportunity to cooperate with and maybe enter NATO have been remarkable. Across Central and Eastern Europe, former Warsaw Pact countries are now hurrying to transform their political, economic and military arrangements to not only offset the instability resulting from the break-up of the Soviet Union but also to gain the opportunity to join NATO.7

Most non-NATO partners have submitted their Individual Partnership Programs of PfP to their parliaments and received approval. Some are also beginning to organize most if not all their armed forces around NATO planning concepts. Hungary and

Romania, two nations with historic grievances, are using cooperation with NATO to improve their bilateral security relationships. PfP has become the essential tool in the demanding task of preparing to meet the responsibilities of full NATO membership.

These reforms have occurred at great speed and have ushered in a period of increased democratization, movement toward free market reforms and even an increased care for human rights. At the same time, the rapid rush to please NATO expansionists has threatened Russian security interests in a manner that has caused President Boris Yeltsin and others to fight the very idea of NATO expansion.9

The United States must now also take the lead to address Russian interests or risk NATO enlargement creating another Cold War boundary several hundred kilometers to the East. To make enlargement work, the United States must take the stand that democratization, economic reform and military control are the means to greater regional stability and prosperity. The United States must continue to work to properly design enlargement mechanisms that meet regional interests as well as allowing the United States to remain a force that does not create instability within the European stability equation.

NATO enlargement will redefine the security architecture in Europe. NATO must now be ready to deal with more regional stability issues as a path toward achieving security not just from an external threat, but also from regional or ethnic

conflicts that threaten stability from within the alliance as well as from outside the alliance as in Bosnia. Expansion will address the particular security and stability requirements of NATO members and as such will force compliance with the principles that have made NATO the strongest and most successful alliance in history.

Strategically, NATO enlargement will not pose a threat to any nation if it is be gradual, deliberate and transparent with no timetable. All members, regardless of size, strength or location will have equal rights and obligations while continuing to adhere to the principles that have made the Alliance the strongest and most successful in history. New NATO members can be expected to demonstrate some core values such as adherence to democratic values, commitment to collective defense and a willingness to work by consensus.¹¹

Enlargement is not a unilateral process nor just a technical formality for Europe. The Russian viewpoint shows major resistance to NATO expansion and fears any encroachment Eastward is a threat to its security interests. According to President Yeltsin, part of the "deal" for the peaceful end to the Cold War was the expectation that no new boundary lines would be drawn closer to Russia. By detailing the key economic, political and military interests of Russia, we can see why Russia reacts to the mere mention of inclusion of Visegrad countries into NATO.

Politically, Russian leaders may be expected to focus more

on internal reforms than international politics as they attempt to "democratize". Certainly, with the recently concluded State Duma elections and the upcoming presidential elections, Russians seem to need to orient more on constitutional reform and building the much needed democratic culture than on responding to threats to national security. 13 However, situations in Chechnya, continued support of the counterinsurgency in Tajikistan and support for interventions in Georgia, Armenia and Bosnia clearly show that Russia has few isolationist tendencies. Russia seems motivated to retain its image as a regional if not a super power. Clearly, many Russians feel ill at ease in the rump state they inherited after the breakup of the Soviet Union. 14 In many republics of the Former Soviet Union and within the Russian Federation, ethnic Russians feel like outsiders. They perceive themselves to have been left behind, both politically and economically, and are jealous of the way the very few have been able to adapt to the fledgling market economy. 15 Such sentiment often results in leaders such as General Lebed reminding the Russian people that Russia was, is and will remain a proud and powerful nation that expect the government to provide some level of economic prosperity.16

As seen in the latest State Duma elections, the potential effect of Russian nationalism is not to be underestimated. With the anti-reform Communists winning the largest block of seats and Zhironovsky's party making a strong showing, the Russian voters seem to be sending a clear message that they are still a proud

and demanding constituency. These results reinforce the lessons of history and make Russia a player in Eurasian affairs.

Economically, Russian interests can be directly threatened by NATO enlargement. As Russia continues on the road to a market economy, it will become oriented more aggressively toward exporting raw materials, importing other goods, and importing technology and science into their industrial base. These economic initiatives rely heavily on international support to Russia's free market reforms.

Russian economic security interests also reside in its desire to continue market reforms within the Russian Federation while it remains a player in world economic markets. As reforms continue, Russian leaders will have to guard against the leaking of capital abroad or being forced into an export/import program that robs the country of its national treasures and international markets. Russian thinking will also quickly see the linkage between Russian economic well being and the economic stability of former Soviet states.¹⁹

Consequently, Russians will oppose any effort that keeps it from developing markets in Europe or creates an environment that economically isolates the Russian Federation and strangles its national industry, science and agriculture. Seeing the economic potential in the West, Russia will be likely to seek a niche in European markets while opposing any enlargement of European organizations that would tend to isolate Russia. Russian interests in world economic affairs were clear when Russian

internal policies toward Chechnya were influenced by threats to slow their reception of IMF and World Bank loans.²⁰ A more self-sufficient Russia would not have allowed such Western influence, but Russia now sees cooperation with Europe as a necessity to their economic recovery.

Seeing themselves as a more sophisticated and astute world player, Russia can also be expected to use economic leverage to create political alliances and influence regional issues throughout Eurasia. Recently, Russia demonstrated its ability to leverage regional hegemony using Caspian Sea oil rights as the fulcrum. In this situation, Russia manipulated itself into the mineral rights contract of the century as well as showing its ability to exercise its economic instrument of power. As seen in this situation, Russia has not lost its ability or desire to influence regional issues. Russia also seems willing to forge relationships with countries like Iran, showing their ability to collaborate with extremist regional neighbors without regard to international condemnation or concerns.

Militarily, Russia will remain fearful of attacks from outside its border so it will continue to stay involved in the security affairs of Europe. Russia sees its military instrument of national power as the jewel of their national security strategy. Although finding it increasing difficult to maintain its conventional forces and nuclear arsenal, Russian active duty military force no longer has the ability to project force into the heart of Europe.²² Russia is capable, however, of using its

military to influence both internal and regional affairs.

Like many countries within the post Cold War world, Russia has found it necessary to execute a strategy of selective engagement. Conventionally, the Russian military operations in Chechnya, Tajikistan, Moldova and Georgia have underscored Russia's continued use of its military power to secure political and economic leverage and stability.²³

Reading all the rhetoric to determine national interests, Russia is acting as a nation threatened by NATO enlargement. Russian leaders have threatened to move nuclear weapons into Belarus²⁴, stifle the initiatives of START I²⁵ and CFE²⁶ as well as threatening a "Cold Peace" that will move everyone back toward a Cold War posture²⁷. Increasingly, there has developed a sense of dissatisfaction within Russian military and political circles with the West and a feeling that Russia has become dependent on the West. Such dependency is seen as threatening to Russian interests in European integration.²⁸

In a study conducted within Russian think tanks, the eastward expansion of NATO was predicted to be planned to take place in several stages. The final two stages in essence completing the surrounding of Russia through the inclusion of the Baltics, Ukraine, and Finland by 2005. These Russian experts are concluding that Western policy toward NATO's future is a direct attempt to isolate Russia and "squeeze" her out of Europe.²⁹

As the debate rages, Russia perceives Germany and the United States as the key players behind NATO enlargement. Germany is

seen as expansionary and the key player within Western Europe. In this sense, according to the Russian experts, it is possible to speak of the resurgence of German expansionism, towards the East and Southeast, which, already twice this century, has sparked the fire of world war and which has become possible at the present time under the cover of the American "nuclear umbrella". 30

Besides Germany, the United States has been declared to be an initiator of NATO's eastward expansion in the attempt to make it possible for the U.S. to consolidate its leading position on the European continent and help compensate for American economic weakness in the region before the European Union. This study makes it clear that if the geopolitical and strategic situation on the European continent changed, that Russia should seek new partners who can withstand Western expansion to the East and Southeast. Southeast.

Of equal concern to Western powers is Boris Yeltsin's decree of September 14, 1995 on the "Strategic Policy of the Russian Federation Toward CIS Member States". This document constitutes a comprehensive plan of action for the forced reconstruction of Russian dominance within its "Near Abroad".

The Near Abroad is a term used to describe a belt of countries that were granted independence from the Soviet Union upon its breakup in 1991. These countries are Lativia, Estonia and Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and

Kyrgyzstan. Using a variety of diplomatic, economic, military, ethnic and international levers Moscow appears to define regional stability as Russian dominance within the Near Abroad.³⁴

Without carefully addressing Russian interests during enlargement, NATO runs the risk of returning the region to the type of turmoil that will create Yeltsin's threatened "Cold Peace". The West must show a genuine willingness to include Russia as an equal partner in resolving international problems of interest to Moscow. The West can expect Russia to cooperate so long as the West is not pushing a position at odds with Russia's vital interests. However, if the West is seen as excluding Russia from the enlargement process, Moscow can be expected to obstruct enlargement in a manner similar to its attempts to influence operations in Bosnia in 1995.35

Mechanisms must be developed that reassure Russian leaders that expansion threatens no one and is in the best interests of all parties, including Russia. The United States stands as a key player capable of leading the way through NATO enlargement. Russia stills perceives the United States as a main external force that is capable of posing threats to its national security, threatening economic and political interests abroad and exerting influence on the economic and political situation in Russia.³⁶

The ways and means that are developed toward Russia must find a mix between adequate consultation before decisions are taken without yielding a veto to Russia. Enhanced dialogue and cooperation must also entail sharing information on issues

regarding politico-security matters having a European dimension; political consultations on issues of common concern (non-proliferation, nuclear safety issues, specific crises in Europe); and cooperation in a wide range of security-related issues including regional peacekeeping, civilian science, humanitarian, environmental and technology policy. More specifically, the United States' ability to support expansion can now be offered in terms of political, economic and military initiatives.

ADDRESSING RUSSIAN INTERESTS DURING NATO ENLARGEMENT

The ways and means of addressing these issues need to take a broad approach to insure all Russian interests are addressed through a variety of forums. In cooperation with other security organizations, the United States' policies and programs must bilaterally constitute a broad, open and credible rapproachment that allows NATO enlargement to proceed without substantial Russian interference.

The United States needs to continue to lead NATO away from its traditional collective defense orientation toward a parallel collective security organization. More than semantics, the United States can lead NATO toward an organization that orients toward internal defense or police actions with regional stability implications. Much like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE), a NATO oriented on internal stability will pose less of a threat to Russia while using its military expertise to maintain regional stability. NATO must be encouraged to continue to execute Partnership For Peace

initiatives as a proven means to create the needed transparency in planning and training for regional stability contingencies.

Any policy within NATO must be also be sensitive to the stationing of tactical nuclear weapons, either within current NATO countries or those closer to Moscow. Clearly, the mere suggestion of stationing nuclear weapons in Poland has already created a threat within the Russian hierarchy, causing a swift, albeit political reaction.³⁷ Policy makers must be sensitive to the inherently threatening and aggressive nature of nuclear umbrellas. The "what" of expansion must be oriented on internal national defensive requirements as opposed to moves that inherently threaten an already paranoid nation.

NATO expansion needs to exclude the requirement that allows permanent placement of foreign military forces, material or nuclear weapons within a new member's borders. Much like Norway or Denmark, NATO can engineer the enlargement in a manner that makes the distinction between war or acute conflict and time of peace. This consideration of Russian interests is an example of concessions that do not reduce the impact of NATO protection.

The United States needs also to continue its efforts at conventional force reductions. More that just bi-laterally between Russia and the United States, the United States should orchestrate a proper force mix and contribution level that gives NATO a military component that can insure regional stability through Combined Joint Task Forces without any one country so strong that it becomes threatening within the Eurasian community.

Using the CFE Treaty as an example, conventional forces can be managed in such a manner that insures regional stability but does not allow any one nation the capability of attacking another.

Unfortunately, the <u>NATO Expansion Study</u> has said that new members can agree to positioning of foreign forces' nuclear weapons on their soil even though the likelihood of such an even is remote.³⁹ Although threatening by nature, this provision has military and political merit since negotiations on positioning of tactical nuclear weapons is sensitive, controversial and often takes too much time to negotiate when a clear and present danger appears. Likewise, stationing rights and overflight agreements as well as defensive contingency planning must be accomplished well before the need to employ forces becomes pressing.

The point is that to insure the full measure of Article V protection⁴⁰, coordination must take place before the need arises. Though positioning of nuclear weapons and conventional forces can increase the tension between Russia and NATO, coordination should not. Transparency of action through PfP, NACC and OSCE is again a means that can insure that neither foreign forces nor nuclear weapons will be permanently stationed within Central and Eastern Europe. To do otherwise is to give Russia a veto over NATO membership.

Politically, the "who" and "when" of NATO enlargement needs also to be a major concern for the United States. As a practical matter, the United States should use its influence to exclude countries with Russia's Near Abroad from NATO membership. This

position will tend to alienate certain countries such as Ukraine and the Baltics who have favored NATO inclusion. However, including any country within the Near Abroad becomes impractical when considering the threat this may pose to Russia. On the other hand, as part of broader security change, excluding these nations will relieve tension and threat in the eyes of the Russian hierarchy as well as reinforcing the non-threatening aspects of NATO enlargement.

As countries are excluded from the enlargement process, it will be necessary for excluded countries to stay engaged in the broader security architecture in Europe. Ukraine, for example, may see great promise in NATO membership.⁴³ To keep them and other nations, like the Baltics, from feeling left out of the security umbrella in Europe, NATO and the United States needs to insure that their security promises are fulfilled through broader forums such as the NACC, CIS or OSCE and not through bi-lateral agreements with the Russians.

As NATO enlarges, the United States can diminish Russian concerns and address Russian security interests by encouraging Russian dialogue through these same forums. 44 Groups such as OSCE and NACC, programs such as the Partnership for Peace and even the G7 have a significant impact on the status and foreign policy of Russia. Since NATO will not grant Russia a say over expansion, dialogue within these forums allows Russia to voice its concerns as well as creating an opportunity for increased transparency in the enlargement process. Through private and

public statements, these organizations can bring NATO enlargement into the larger security dialog while addressing Russian reaction and overreaction to the step by step process that will eventually lead to new NATO members.

The United States can and should influence the time table for enlargement. Clearly, the Russians will see any quick expansion as threatening. The United States should attempt to influence the process in a manner that does not allow the first new NATO member earlier that 2001. These five years will allow a politically deliberate and paranoid Russia to see the enlargement unfold as well as giving Russia ample time to voice their concerns throughout the process.

The time table for inclusion can best be influenced by the requirements for membership. Having participated in the NATO Enlargement Study, the United States has already agreed that inclusion must insure that the new members can economically and militarily contribute to the alliance. To slow the enlargement, the United States must use its veto power and demand that every aspiring nation be capable of fully contributing to all the requirements of NATO members including the provisions for civilian control of the military and resolution of border disputes. Realistically, no country is ready, in the short run, to contribute in every area, militarily, economically, politically and socially. Most aspiring nations are attempting to balance free market, democratic and military matters as they try to become worthy of membership but none seem ready to do it

all and gain a consensus for inclusion among current NATO members.

Although this seems reasonable and appropriate given the start point of most nations, the United States must defend against hedging the prerequisites in order to get the first new member into NATO. Although this seems reasonable, countries like Poland and Hungary are making every attempt to gain quick acceptance. If inclusion is accomplished with the least bit of arbitrariness, Russia will easily be able to claim NATO is quickly redrawing lines in Eastern Europe with little concern other than threatening Russia itself. With little effort, the United States can initiate dialog that curtails a hasty expansion of NATO.

Besides working within the NATO structures and other
European security organizations, the United States needs to work
bilaterally with Russia as a catalyst toward expansion.
Bilateral communication needs to take place between heads of
state, key foreign, defense and economic ministers and through
military to military contacts. By addressing Russian economic
and political needs outside the NATO mechanisms, the United
States offers an important opportunity to satiate Russian
internal security and political requirements.

United States emissaries can communicate to the Russian leaders that no new members will be allowed who are openly hostile to Russian interests. Otherwise Russia can legitimately claim that NATO enlargement might lead to isolating Russia from

the broader security dialog. Bilaterally, the United States must arbitrate and insure that new members enter the alliance as contributors to regional stability, market reforms, and human rights and not just to create a military alliance that threatens Russia.

Economically, it can be argued that Russia can lose export and import market share as a result of NATO expansion. As aspiring nations move to Westernize their military capabilities, a corresponding decrease in Russian military sales and other technology-based exports is likely to occur. Besides the threat of lost exports to Eastern European countries, of particular concern to the United States should be Russian initiatives to seek other markets with nations such as China or nations whose fundamentalism tends to threaten United States' interests.

To address this economic impact on regional stability, the United States should continue to develop cooperation within the arms and military technology market by insuring Russia plays an appropriate part. Such a market would imply continuing the standardizing the major types of armaments, lifting restrictions on access of post-Soviet republics to Western military technologies, adopting common rules of competition of producers within that single market, and devising a system of supervision over export of military technologies to developing countries.

Certainly, NATO members contain most of the major military equipment producers. The case can be initiated that within

current NATO structures it is possible to exclude Russian-made products from European military consumers. It appears Russia needs to develop the diplomatic, economic and military mechanisms that are required of a competitor in the European market. The risk in isolating Russia results when Russia is forced to seek new markets that run the risk of threatening the interests of the West. Russia needs to be encouraged to cooperate within European markets and proceed with defense conversion and other reforms that will sustain its industrial capacity.

We are already seeing European cooperation in several major military equipment developments from fighter planes to tanks. It appears there is incentive within Western Europe for such cooperation. The United States must, as a matter of policy, encourage expansion of this cooperation toward Russia. United States can reinforce cooperation by leveraging issues such as foreign military sales, oil rights, open borders negotiations, international invitations, and treaty negotiations as incentives to allow or support military market reforms within Russia and Europe.

Within NATO, the United States must lead in taking the current initiatives being developed within Europe to the next level. With United States leadership working with Russia and the European Union or through the G7, a unified arms and military technology market can be created that eases any economic threat that NATO enlargement might cause.

CONCLUSION

"The task before us is nothing less than to distill a sense of direction from a world in which almost all key elements are changing simultaneously. Stability in Europe requires reaffirming the centrality of NATO rather than diluting it in abstract multilateralism."

Henry Kissinger, 13 July 1995

Heads of State and governments of the 16 member countries of NATO have embraced NATO enlargement as an evolutionary reality within the security architecture of Europe. They see enlargement as a contributing factor to enhanced security and stability for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area. With the many proclamations of the viability and necessity of NATO expansion, it is clear that NATO will expand.

But as NATO expands it also need to change. No longer can NATO be oriented on defending against a Soviet invasion. Without the clear and present danger that once separated NATO from the Warsaw Pact, NATO must now realize that it must transition from a security organization to a regional stability organization. Its military structure must develop into an organization that is prepared to address threats to regional stability with less orientation on the defense of Western Europe from a Russian led invasion.

With the best organized, equipped and exercised military structure in all of Europe, NATO is the best and most ready organization to direct the restructuring of the security architecture in Europe. As it stands now, the only threat that

enlargement poses is the one that is perceived by the Russian government and people.

Discussing the stability of Europe is impossible without questioning the role of Russia. Will Russia become a reliable partner or will it remain an unstable political and socioeconomic entity which could put peace and security in Europe at risk? There is no doubt that the strategic situation has changed dramatically since the unification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union. As far as security in Europe is concerned, present day Russia is different from the former Soviet Union and its needs must be addressed as such.

Russia's military, although no longer threatening the borders of NATO and in an advanced state of disrepair, still retains its the ability to be a regional player. Economically in a state of collapse with recovery easily five to ten years away, Russia still retains the ability to use economic power to influence regional developments. Politically, there is an unmistakable retreat from reform and a growth of nostalgia for old habits that completes the picture of Russia as a nation whose paranoias are fueled by NATO enlargement.⁴⁹

These paranoias can not be taken lightly. Russian foreign policy will continue to be of an independent and assertive nature. If Russia fails to remain an important part of the Eurasian equation, it runs the risk of being swept away by a wave of aggressive nationalism. At issue is how to address Russian security interests in countries that NATO sees as central to the

redesign of the security architecture in Europe.

Russia has clearly laid claim to having national interests in Central and Eastern Europe. Geostrategically, Russia is resolved to preserve and develop good relations with Western countries. Russia is also expending a great deal of time and effort on achieving and strengthening social, political and economic stability within the Russian Federation. From this point of view, NATO enlargement can threaten Russian national interests. The danger lies in the emergence of the feeling of military and political isolation of Russia; in the revival of anti-Western and militaristic trends in the Russian public.

As NATO enlargement processes take shape, the framework for US-Russian relations has to build policies and take actions to secure stability in all of Eurasia while avoiding the rekindling of a reflexive global rivalry between Russia and the United States. During NATO enlargement, the United States has and must continue to work bi-laterally with Russia to establish enlargement as a means to the end of improved security.

Besides taking the lead on the NATO enlargement study, contributing financially to economic reforms in aspiring nations and working hard to create transparencies through programs like the Partnership for Peace, the United States must also continue dialog and develop policies with Russia that insures expansion does not de-stabilize Central and Eastern Europe. If NATO enlargement is not handled effectively, the United States can become the integral party that endows the new millennium with a

return to warfare and aggressive nationalism in Europe.

Likewise, the United States stands as the best party to preclude

Russian interference with NATO enlargement.

The United States' vision for European security is of a system rooted in a common commitment to democracy and free economies, and mutual respect for security, human rights, independence of states and the inviolability of borders. Only by creating transparency of processes while addressing Russian security questions, either directly or indirectly, can enlargement hope to succeed. To move forward, the United States needs to make Russia not only a player, but a player who plays by NATO's and international rules.

The situation requires a flexible, creative and holistic approach to addressing Russian security interests. The solution is the combination of integration and cooperation. The integration of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe into western structures must be coupled with energetic, cooperative efforts towards Russia and the exclusion of all Near Abroad countries from enlargement consideration. These efforts should be undertaken on various institutional levels and through numerous organizations. They need to encompass as many areas of political, cultural and economic exchange as possible. The object is to establish an intelligent and productive arrangement that provides security and stability while avoiding an adversarial deadlock.

US-Russian relations during the whole process must be based

on reciprocity, mutual respect and confidence, avoiding surprise decisions by either NATO or Russia that could affect the interests of the other. The United States stands to gain significant power if it can address Russian concerns with respect to NATO enlargement. If we are really ready to lead NATO, we must take the lead in the development of its wider relationship within European stability and Russia. With NATO decisions not being subject to veto by any non-member state, the United States, through its national security policies and programs, can insure that NATO enlargement is one of the means that contributes to the overall security of Europe without drawing new dividing lines or threatening the stability of Europe.

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